The Constitutional Crisis in Hong Kong—Is It Over? by Feng, Lin
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 9 Number 2 
5-1-2000 
The Constitutional Crisis in Hong Kong—Is It Over? 
Lin Feng 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lin Feng, The Constitutional Crisis in Hong Kong—Is It Over?, 9 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 281 (2000). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol9/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 2000 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN HONG KONG-IS IT
OVER?
Lin Fengt
Abstract: The judgment of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal ("CFA") in the
right of abode case has created several constitutional issues, three of which will be
addressed in this paper. They are: (1) whether the CFA has the authority to review
Chinese legislation; (2) whether the National People's Congress Standing Committee
("NPCSC") should interpret or amend the Basic Law; and (3) whether an original
legislative intent approach or a purposive approach should be adopted for the
interpretation of the Basic Law. Prompt resolution of these issues is necessary to resolve
constitutional uncertainty in Hong Kong. Successful resolution of these issues may
require both the NPCSC and the CFA to adopt their own interpretive approaches and
exercise their own constitutional authority in strict compliance with the procedures of the
Basic Law. Adoption of this unique constitutional mechanism would preserve Hong
Kong's common law system while allowing the concept of "one country, two systems" to
be implemented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional crisis in Hong Kong began with the judgment of
the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal ("CFA") in the right of abode case, in
which the CFA held, among other things, that it had the authority to review
the constitutionality of the acts of China's legislative bodies, the National
People's Congress ("NPC") and the NPC Standing Committee ("NPCSC").'
The judgment attracted immediate criticism from mainland China ("the
Mainland") because, from the Mainland's perspective, it is unacceptable for
the regional courts in Hong Kong to have the authority to review Chinese
legislation.
2
Although the jurisdictional issue is the Mainland's principal concern,
the CFA's judgment will have many more serious consequences for Hong
Kong. Strict implementation of the CFA's judgment, in particular its
interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2) of the Basic Law, will likely lead
to the influx of up to 1.6 million Mainland Chinese into Hong Kong. This is
t Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law; Associate Director, Centre for Chinese and
Comparative Law, City University of Hong Kong; Ph.D., LL.M., LL.B., barrister, England, Wales, and
Hong Kong.
The right of abode case was heard by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal, and by the
Court of Final Appeal. For details, see Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Final Appeal Nos. 14-16, 1
HKC 291 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
2 Four senior constitutional scholars in China have argued that in this respect, the judgment
constitutes a challenge to the sovereignty of the Mainland. For details, see Serious Debates on the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Final Appeal, MING PAO, Feb. 8, 1999, Discussion Column.
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a result that neither the Hong Kong government nor the majority of its
people wants.
This anticipated event raises an additional constitutional issue:
whether these two provisions of the Basic Law should be re-interpreted by
the NPCSC or whether they should be amended in order to prevent mass
immigration. The Hong Kong government chose to seek re-interpretation of
the two relevant provisions from the NPCSC, the organ with the ultimate
power of interpretation of the Basic Law.3 Although the NPCSC provided
its interpretation on June 26, 1999, the constitutional crisis in Hong Kong
has continued. When the NPCSC interpreted the two provisions of the Basic
Law, it adopted an original legislative intent approach. The decision to
adopt this approach, as opposed to an approach that interprets the law
broadly and generously, raises an essential constitutional issue: should the
Basic Law be interpreted according to a broad and generous approach, an
original legislative intent approach, or some third, alternative approach?
These important constitutional issues remain unresolved and must be
addressed immediately and properly. Failure to do so will, at a minimum,
lead to great uncertainty in the legal system in Hong Kong. At worst, it will
lead to an even more serious constitutional crisis and possibly to the
complete destruction of the common law system and rule of law in Hong
Kong. This Article first outlines the development of Hong Kong's
constitutional crisis from its start through the NPCSC re-interpretation.
Next, it examines the three important constitutional issues raised by the
decision: (1) the authority of the CFA to interpret the acts of the NPC or
NPCSC; (2) the appropriateness of the NPCSC's re-interpretation; and (3)
the appropriate interpretive approach to be adopted for the interpretation of
the Basic Law. Each of these issues is examined in detail, focusing on the
inherent problems caused by the interaction (and conflicts) of the different
legal systems in Hong Kong and the Mainland, which together operate under
the concept of "one country, two systems."4 Based on its examination of the
3 See Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xinzhengqu Jibenfa [Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China] (adopted Apr. 4, 1990) art. 158(1)
[hereinafter Basic Law], translated in <http://www.constitution.org/cons/hongkong.txt>. The Basic Law is
essentially Hong Kong's written constitution and has been in place since the handover to China. Enacted
by the national Chinese legislature, the Basic Law has a higher status in Hong Kong's legal system than
any other laws. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
4 "One country, two systems" refers to the arrangement under which the governments of Hong
Kong and China currently coexist. Pursuant to this arrangement, for the 50 years following China's
resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, the Chinese socialist system and socialist policies are not to be
enforced in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and lifestyle are to remain unchanged.
Hong Kong is vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, including that of final
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three constitutional issues, this Article suggests that successful resolution of
the constitutional crisis and any future constitutional issues requires the
establishment of a unique constitutional mechanism. Under this proposed
mechanism, both the NPCSC and the CFA would adopt their own
interpretive approaches and exercise their own constitutional authority in
strict compliance with the procedures set down in the Basic Law. The CFA
could decide whether an act of the NPCSC is inapplicable in Hong Kong
based on any inconsistency with the Basic Law. This mechanism would
allow the NPCSC to exercise its authority to overrule a judgment of the CFA
if it found a CFA judgment in violation of the Basic Law. Such a
mechanism would permit the two legal systems to converge, thus allowing
both the common law system and the rule of law to be maintained in Hong
Kong.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
The right of abode case involves the immigration status of four illegal
immigrants who claimed permanent residency and a right of abode in Hong
Kong.5 Of the four applicants, three arrived in Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.
Each of these three individuals was born out of wedlock to a Chinese citizen
father who had resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of at least
seven years. The fourth applicant, who was also born out of wedlock to a
Hong Kong permanent resident, came to Hong Kong in December 1994 and
overstayed his entry permit. Each applicant reported to the Immigration
Department after July 1, 1997, and asserted his or her status as a permanent
resident under Article 24(2) of the Basic Law. Article 24(2) provides that a
person of Chinese nationality bom outside Hong Kong to a Hong Kong
permanent resident is automatically a permanent resident of Hong Kong.
6
Accordingly, these applicants, by virtue of at least one parent's permanent
adjudication. See Sino-British Joint Declaration, Annex 1 (1984), reprinted in YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 513-14 (1997).
' SeeNgKaLing, 1HKC 291.
6 This provision of the Basic Law was incorporated into local legislation by the Immigration
(Amendment) (No. 2), which was adopted by the Provisional Legislative Council of Hong Kong and signed
by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. Immigration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance, No. 122 of 1997
(adopted July 1, 1997) [hereinafter Immigration Ordinance (Amendment) (No. 2)]. For the amended
version of the Immigration Ordinance, see Immigration Ordinance (adopted Apr. 1, 1972, multiple
amendments) Cap. 115 [hereinafter Immigration Ordinance], translated in BLIS on Internet Homepage
(visited May 14, 2000) <http://www.justice.gov.hk>.
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resident status in Hong Kong, claimed that they had a right of abode as
conferred by Article 24(3) of the Basic Law.7
On July 1, 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council 8 of Hong Kong
enacted the Immigration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance (the "No. 2
Ordinance"), which provides that any child asserting the right of abode
under Article 24 of the Basic Law must be born in wedlock. 9 On July 10,
1997, the Provisional Legislative Council also enacted the Immigration
(Amendment) (No. 3) Ordinance (the "No. 3 Ordinance"), which was
deemed retroactive to July 1, 1997.10 The No. 3 Ordinance established a
new procedural mechanism under which a person's status as a permanent
resident could only be established by the possession of both a valid travel
document and an attached certificate of entitlement." Under this ordinance,
the certificate of entitlement is valid only if it has been affixed to a valid
travel document. 12
Furthermore, the Immigration Department published a notice on July
11, 1997, which stipulated that an application for a certificate of entitlement
must be made through the Exit-Entry Administration of the Public Security
Bureau in the Mainland district where the applicant resides. 13  Under
Chinese law, applicants attempting to stay permanently in Hong Kong are
governed by administrative regulations. One of these regulations provides
that "Mainland citizens departing based on personal grounds in order to
settle in Hong Kong/Macao shall be subject to examination and approval
under the quota system in order to safeguard and maintain the economic
prosperity of Hong Kong and Macao. '' 4 An applicant must obtain a one-
7 Article 24(3) provides that children of persons mentioned in Article 24(2) shall have the right of
abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") and shall be qualified to obtain, in
accordance with the laws of the HKSAR, permanent identity cards which state their right of abode. See
Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 24(3).
The Provisional Legislative Council is the legislative body of the HKSAR and was established in
Hong Kong according to the decisions of the National People's Congress Standing Committee. The
legitimacy of its establishment was challenged in the right of abode case, but was confirmed by the Court
of Final Appeal. See Ng Ka Ling, I HKC 291.
9 See Immigration Ordinance (Amendment) (No. 2), supra note 6, sched. 1, para. 2.
Io See Immigration (Amendment) (No. 3) Ordinance, No. 124 of 1997 (adopted July 10, 1997)
sched. 1, para. 2 [hereinafter Immigration Ordinance (Amendment) (No. 3)]. For the amended version of
the Immigration Ordinance, see Immigration Ordinance, supra note 6.
Id. sched. 1, pira. 2.
12 Id.; see also Ng Ka Ling, I HKC 291.13 This notice was published on July 16, 1997. See GOVERNMENT HKSAR GAZETTE
EXTRAORDINARY 67-70 (1997).
14 The administrative regulation is entitled Zhongguo Guomin Yinsushi Wanglai Xianggang Diqu
Huozhe Aomen Diqu de Zanxing Guanli Banfa [Interim Procedures for the Administration of Chinese
Citizens on Passage to and from the Hong Kong Region and Macao Region for Personal Affairs](promulgated Dec. 25, 1986) art. 5, reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO
[GAZETrE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Dec. 20, 1986, at 1051-55.
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way travel permit from the applicant's local Exit-Entry Administration of
the Public Security Bureau before he or she can depart the Mainland for
settlement in Hong Kong.1
5
. The Director of Hong Kong's Immigration Department has taken the
position that an applicant's status as a permanent resident by descent can
only be established in accordance with the No. 3 Ordinance, or, in other
words, by holding a one-way travel permit affixed with a certificate of
entitlement. 16 In the right of abode case, none of the applicants held either a
one-way travel permit or a certificate of entitlement. Thus, according to the
Director of Immigration, none of the applicants enjoyed the right of abode,
and they were required to return to the Mainland to apply to the local Exit-
Entry Administration for travel permits. In addition, the fact that the
applicants arrived in Hong Kong on or before July 1, 1997, and submitted
their applications to the Immigration Department before July 10, 1997, was
deemed irrelevant because the No. 3 Ordinance had retroactive effect.
However, the Director of the Immigration Department was satisfied that the
applicants (with one exception) were permanent residents within the third
category defined in Article 24(2) of the Basic Law. 7
Five issues were identified by the CFA in the right of abode case: (1)
whether the CFA has jurisdiction to interpret the relevant provisions of the
Basic Law, or whether it is bound to seek an interpretation of such
provisions from the NPCSC; (2) whether the scheme introduced in the No. 3
Ordinance is constitutional; (3) whether the retroactive application of the
No. 3 Ordinance is constitutional; (4) whether the requirement in the No. 2
Ordinance that a child be born in wedlock to obtain permanent residency is
constitutional; and (5) whether the Provisional Legislative Council is a legal
legislative body. 
18
According to the CFA's judgment, the courts in Hong Kong have
jurisdiction to determine whether legislative acts of the NPC or the NPCSC
are consistent with the Basic Law and to declare them invalid when they are
inconsistent.' 9 In making such decisions, Hong Kong courts are to adopt a
purposive approach in the interpretation of the Basic Law, under which they
consider the purpose of the Basic Law and its relevant provisions, as well as
the language of its text in light of the context. 20 The purpose of a particular
's Id. art. 6.
:6 See Ng Ka Ling, I HKC 291.
'7 id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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provision of the Basic Law may be ascertained from its nature, from other
provisions of the Basic Law, or from relevant extrinsic materials. The CFA
alone has the authority to decide whether the conditions for making a referral
to the NPCSC are satisfied.21 The No. 3 Ordinance was held unconstitutional
to the extent that it required permanent residents residing on the Mainland to
obtain a one-way permit before they could enjoy the constitutional right of
abode.22 The retroactive provision in the No. 3 Ordinance was deemed
unconstitutional because it took away the constitutional right of abode that the
applicants already enjoyed, and the No. 2 Ordinance was found
unconstitutional to the extent that it treated children born out of wedlock
differently from legitimate children.23 Finally, the CFA held that the
formation of the Provisional Legislative Council was consistent with the Basic
Law.
24
The CFA's judgment was immediately hailed as a landmark
constitutional case in Hong Kong, 25 primarily because the CFA laid down the
parameters of its statutory interpretive authority, in 2particular its authority to
review laws enacted by China's national legislature.2 However, the judgment
has been strongly criticized by some scholars from the Mainland. They argue
that the CFA erred by not referring the case to the NPCSC for interpretation
and that the CFA exceeded its interpretative authority when it stated that it
could review Chinese national legislation. 27
Shortly after the judgment was issued, the CFA, pursuant to an
application from the Hong Kong government, released a clarification of its
decision.28 The CFA stated that it accepted the authority of the NPCSC to
21 Id.
22 Id.
23Id.
24 id.
25 Many scholars and pro-democracy groups have commented that in terms of the constitutional
development of Hong Kong this case has had the same impact that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803),
had in the United States.
26 These include the laws enacted by the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee.
27 The most serious criticism came from four eminent Chinese constitutional scholars who were also
drafters of the Basic Law. For details, see Serious Debates on the Jurisdiction of the Court of Final
Appeal, supra note 2. Some scholars from Hong Kong also criticized the judgment, believing the CFA had
made some fundamental mistakes in its judgment. For details, see Albert Chen, The Court of Final
Appeal's Ruling in the "Illegal Migrant" Children Case: A Critical Commentary on the Application of
Article 158 of the Basic Law (1999), reprinted in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT
OVER INTERPRETATION 73-74, 90 (Johannes M. M. Chan et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Essay 1]; Albert
Chen, The Court of Final Appeal's Ruling in the "Illegal Migrant'" Children Case: Congressional
Supremacy and Judicial Review (1999), reprinted in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT
OVER INTERPRETATION, supra, at 113, 113-14, 141 [hereinafter Essay 2]; Lin Laifan et al., Renda Kezuo
Rouxin Jieshi [The NPC Can Make a Flexible Interpretation], MING PAO, May 18, 1999.
28 The full statement of clarification was printed in Ng Ka Ling v. Director oflmmigration, No. 2, i
HKC 425 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 1999). This statement of clarification was hailed by the
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make an interpretation under Article 158 of the Basic Law and that such an
interpretation, if consistent with the Basic Law, would be followed by the
courts in Hong Kong.29 However, the clarification avoided the issue of
whether or not the CFA has the authority to review the acts of the NPC or
NPCSC when such acts are inconsistent with the Basic Law.
30
Although the CFA's clarification prevented one potential
constitutional crisis regarding the NPCSC's authority to, on its own
initiative, overrule the judgment of the CFA through re-interpretation, the
CFA's judgment was still effective and required implementation. A
preliminary report by the Hong Kong government showed that strict
implementation of the CFA's judgment would lead to the influx of 1.6
million Mainland Chinese into Hong Kong. 31 Such an impact was perceived
to be too onerous for Hong Kong to handle. The focus of the constitutional
debate then shifted to the issue of how to legally stop the influx of the
majority of those people, either by amending the Basic Law or by asking the
NPCSC to interpret the two provisions of the Basic Law relevant to the
case. 32  After a period of heated debate regarding the constitutionality of
those two options, the Hong Kong government decided to seek re-
interpretation from the NPCSC. This decision was ratified by the
Provisional Legislative Council. 33  The Chief Executive then sent his report
to the Mainland's State Council34 and requested its assistance in seeking
interpretation from the NPCSC. The State Council, after studying the report,
Hong Kong government as a sensible way to clear up misunderstanding on the controversial issues of the
judgment but was strongly criticized by many legal scholars. Such a clarification was unprecedented in the
Hong Kong court system.
29 See id.
30 The CFA only stated that it cannot question the authority of the NPC or the NPCSC to perform
any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein. Id.
31 See The Chief Executive's Report to the State Council Concerning the Right of Abode Cases:
Report on Seeking Assistance from the Central People's Government in Solving Problems Encountered in
the Implementation of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of People s Republic
of China, May 20, 1999, reprinted in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER
INTERPRETATION, supra note 27, at 474 [hereinafter Report on Seeking Assistance].
32 The potential influx is one consequence of the CFA's interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2) of
the Basic Law.
33 On May 19, 1999, when the Legislative Council debated the government's proposal to seek re-
interpretation from NPCSC, 19 pro-democracy councilors walked out. Among the remaining 38
councilors, 35 voted for the government, 2 voted against, and I abstained. See APPLE DAILY, May 20,
1999.
3 The State Council is the executive branch of the Chinese government and is defined in Article 85
of the Constitution as "the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, the executive
body of the highest organ of state power (i.e., the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee),
and the highest organ of state administration." Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the
People's Republic of China] (adopted Dec. 4, 1982, amended Apr. 12, 1988, Mar. 29, 1993, Mar. 15, 1999)
art. 85 [hereinafter PRC Constitution], reprinted and translated in I CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS. (CCH
Austl. Ltd.) 4-500 (1997).
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made a request to the NPCSC to interpret the two provisions of the Basic
Law.
The Committee of the Chairmen of the NPCSC, after examining the
request and consulting the Basic Law Committee,3 submitted a bill to the
NPCSC seeking its interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2). After a half-
day of discussion at its bi-monthly meeting, the NPCSC adopted the bill of
interpretation on June 26, 1999.36 The re-interpretation stated that the CFA
did not seek an interpretation from the NPCSC as required by Article 158(3)
of the Basic Law and that the CFA's interpretation was inconsistent with the
original legislative intent of the Basic Law. 37 It also stated that Article 22(4)
and Article 24(2) are provisions concerning affairs that are the responsibility
of China's central government and that concern the relationship between the
Central Government and Hong Kong.38  On those bases, the NPCSC re-
interpreted the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and in effect reversed
the CFA's decision in the right of abode case. 39 The re-interpretation of the
two provisions of the Basic Law by the NPCSC should have ended the five-
month long constitutional crisis. Unfortunately, that was not the case.
Instead, the constitutionality of the re-interpretation itself has been debated
and will very likely be challenged before the CFA. Thus, Hong Kong's
constitutional crisis is continuing to develop and may lead to a more serious
33 This Committee was established according to the Basic Law and is composed of six members
from the Mainland and six members from Hong Kong. The Committee was designed to check on the
ability of the NPCSC to exercise its authority to interpret the Basic Law. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao
Dahui Guanyu Pizhun Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa Qicao Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jianshi Quanguo
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa Weiyuanhui de Jueyi
de Jueding [Decision of the National People's Congress to Approve the Proposal by the Drafting
Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the Establishment of the
Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress] (adopted Apr. 4, 1990), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAo DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI [GAZET-rE OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Mar. 25, 1990,
at 106-07.
36 See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Weiyuanhui Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xiangang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa Di Ershier Tiao Di Si Kuan he Di Ershisi Tiao Di Er Kuan Di San
Xiang de Jieshi [Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Article 22,
Paragraph 4 and Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 4 of Article 24 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region] (issued June 26, 1999), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO QUANGUO
RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GONGBAO [GAZE'E OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF
THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], July 7, 1999, at 325-36.
37 Id.
38 id.
39 The re-interpretation states that the phrase "persons of Chinese nationality bom outside Hong
Kong of those residents listed in categories 1 and 2" means "both parents of such persons, whether born
before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or either of such parents
must have fulfilled the condition prescribed by category (1) or (2) of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region at the time of their birth." See id.
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crisis or ultimately even to the breakdown of Hong Kong's common law
system.
Throughout the constitutional crisis, many fascinating and
fundamental constitutional issues have arisen and been discussed.40 Because
many of these issues have already been explored in great detail by other
scholars, the following parts of this Article focus on an examination of three
interrelated fundamental constitutional issues: (1) whether the CFA has the
authority to interpret the acts of the NPC or NPCSC; (2) whether
interpreting, as opposed to amending, the Basic Law is appropriate; and (3)
what the appropriate interpretative approach for the Basic Law is.
4 1
Satisfactory resolution of these issues is essential to the survival of the
common law system in Hong Kong.
III. THE AUTHORITY OF THE CFA TO INTERPRET THE ACTS OF THE NPC OR
NPCSC
The most controversial issue raised by the CFA's judgment in the
right of abode case was whether the CFA had the power to review acts of
China's two legislative bodies, the NPC and the NPCSC. The CFA stated
unambiguously in its judgment that it had the authority and, in fact, the
obligation to declare invalid any acts of the NPC or the NPCSC that were
inconsistent with the Basic Law.42 Since Hong Kong considers the Basic
Law its "mini-constitution," the issue can be restated as whether the CFA
has the power of constitutional review. If the CFA does in fact have the
power of constitutional review, a secondary issue regarding the scope of that
authority arises.43
4o For example, Professor Albert Chen has written two articles that discuss the supremacy of the
NPC and NPCSC in judicial review and the criteria that the CFA may use in making a referral to the
NPCSC for its interpretation of the Basic Law under Article 158. For details, see Essay 1, supra note 27;
Essay 2, supra note 27.
41 It should be noted that these are not the only three constitutional issues that have been raised in the
constitutional crisis. There are many others such as the supreme authority of the NPCSC to interpret the
Basic Law, the proper criteria for referral, the authority of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong to seek
interpretation from the NPCSC, the appropriate procedures for both amendment and interpretation of the
Basic Law, the legitimacy of the NPCSC's re-interpretation, and so on. Some of these issues have already
been discussed in detail by other scholars. See, e.g., Essay 1, supra note 27; Essay 2, supra note 27.
42 See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Final Appeal Nos. 14-16, 1 HKC 291 (Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal 1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
43 The authority and mechanism of constitutional review exists in most countries with a written
constitution. But the organ that exercises such authority may be different from one country to another. It
may be an ordinary court, a special constitutional court, or the supreme legislature.
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A. The CFA 's Authority to Review the Acts of the NPC and the NPCSC
Most common law scholars in Hong Kong believe that the CFA
should have the power of constitutional review."4 This view is based on the
fact that prior to its handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong had two
constitutional documents, the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions. 4
These two documents established the constitutional structure in Hong Kong
and allocated authority to the principal government organs such as the
Governor, the Legislative Council, and the courts.46 In theory, courts in
Hong Kong had the authority to review the constitutionality of all local
legislative and administrative acts. In practice, however, they rarely
exercised their authority to review the constitutionality of local legislation. 7
This situation changed in 1990, when the Bill of Rights Ordinance was
enacted and the Letters Patent was amended.48 Since then, many cases have
been brought before the courts in Hong Kong challenging local legislative
and administrative acts on the basis of their inconsistency with either the Bill
of Rights Ordinance or the amended Letters Patent.49
Prior to Hong Kong's handover to China, the British Parliament could
also enact laws for Hong Kong. Under the British constitutional principle of
parliamentary sovereignty, the status of the acts of Parliament was higher
than that of Hong Kong's colonial constitutional documents, which were the
documents issued through the exercise of the residual royal prerogative.50
44 See YASH GHAI, supra note 4, at 195-97 (1997); see also MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFRONTATION IN HONG KONG: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASIC LAW 39-78 (1989).
45 These two documents were issued by the Queen through the exercise of royal prerogative. See
PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG apps. at 406-26 (2d
ed. 1994).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Article 7(3) was added to the Letters Patent, which provides the following:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966, as applied to Hong Kong, shall
be implemented through the laws of Hong Kong. No law of Hong Kong shall be made after the
coming into operation of the Hong Kong Letters Patent 1991 (No. 2) [8 June 1991] that restricts
the rights and freedoms enjoyed in Hong Kong in a manner which is inconsistent with that
Covenant as applied to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong Letters Patent 1991 (No. 2) art. 7(3) (June 8, 1991).
9 Most cases allege violations of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. There is only one case where the
court stated that the actual legal ground for challenging the validity of legislation was the colonial
constitutional document, i.e., the Letters Patent. See Lee Miu-ling v. Attorney General, I HKC 124 (Hong
Kong Court of Appeal 1996), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
o See WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 45, at 32-38.
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Courts in Hong Kong did not have the authority to challenge the legality or
validity of any acts of the British Parliament.51
Hong Kong has a written constitution, the Basic Law, which has been
in place since the handover to China. The Basic Law has a higher status in
Hong Kong's legal system than all Hong Kong local legislation.
Additionally, it has at least the same status as any other Chinese national
legislation within China's legal system.52 Thus, some scholars have argued
that the courts in Hong Kong have not been granted any authority of
constitutional review.53 The legal basis for this argument is a narrow
interpretation of the term "constitution," which focuses on the fact that the
Basic Law is technically not a constitution. 4 This view is correct from the
perspective of the Mainland. But from Hong Kong's perspective, the Basic
Law has the highest status in Hong Kong's legal hierarchy and performs all
the necessary functions of a constitution.55 Thus, the Basic Law can be
regarded as Hong Kong's constitution. 56 This view is generally shared by
scholars in Hong Kong. 7 Although the Basic Law does not establish any
special mechanisms for constitutional review, it guarantees that Hong
Kong's common law system will remain unchanged for at least fifty years.
5
As a result, Hong Kong's original constitutional review mechanism, as part
of the common law system, should also be maintained following the
handover.
5' See id. at 32-33.
52 Some Chinese constitutional scholars argue that the Basic Law has a higher status than any other
national legislation, but such an understanding is not supported by any specific constitutional provisions or
authorities. See Hu JINGGUANG, ZHONGGUO XIANFA WENTI YANJIU [EXAMINATION OF CHINESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES] 290-95 (1998).
53 See Wu Kangmin, Zhengque Lijie Jibenfa 158 Tiao [Properly Understanding Article 158 of the
Basic Law], MING PAO, June 25, 1999, at B13.
54 This argument is based on the fact that China only has one constitution and the Basic Law is a
piece of national legislation enacted by the NPC, not a constitution. For details, see Hu JINGGUANG, supra
note 52.
55 A constitution performs the functions of setting up and allocating powers to main governmental
organs, defining the relationship between different governmental organs, and protecting the fundamental
rights of the citizen. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION I-
35 (18th ed. 1959).
56 See Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert Chen, Preface to THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE
iii (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert Chen eds., 1988). See also WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 45, at 68.
57 See YASH GHAI, supra note 4, at 137-84.
59 See Basic Law, supra note 3, arts. 2, 8, 19, 81.
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B. Limitation on the CFA's Authority to Review the Acts of the NPC and
the NPCSC
While most scholars accept the view that courts in Hong Kong still
enjoy the power of constitutional review, different views exist as to the
scope of that power following the handover. The dispute centers on whether
the courts have the authority to examine the consistency of the acts of the
NPC and the NPCSC with the Basic Law-the very issue that started the
constitutional crisis. A satisfactory answer requires a careful examination of
the interaction between China's civil law system and Hong Kong's common
law system.
In the right of abode case, the CFA examined the issue of
constitutional review and found that it had the power to review acts of the
NPC and the NPCSC for consistency with the Basic Law. 59 Shortly
afterwards, upon the request of the Hong Kong government, the CFA issued
a statement of clarification regarding this issue. The clarification stated that
the CFA did not question the authority of the NPCSC to make an
interpretation under Article 158, which would be binding on the courts in
Hong Kong. 60 The clarification also stated that the CFA's decision did not
question, and the CFA accepted that it could not question, the authority of
the NPC or the NPCSC to promulgate any laws or take action in accordance
with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedures therein.6' However,
the CFA attached two conditions to its acceptance of the position that the
acts of the NPC and NPCSC cannot be challenged.6 2 First, those acts must
be consistent with the provisions of the Basic Law.63 Second, those acts
must be undertaken in accordance with the procedures set down in the Basic
Law.64 The CFA did not express any view as to whether it has the authority
to challenge the validity of acts of the NPC or the NPCSC if those acts
violate one or both of the conditions.
Whether the courts in Hong Kong have the authority to review the
acts of their sovereign is a novel issue which the courts in Hong Kong have
no former experience with. In colonial times, the legal status of Hong
Kong's constitutional documents was inferior to acts of. the British
59 Most of people in the HKSAR, including legislators, legal professionals, scholars, and citizens,
have interpreted the decision in the right of abode case this way.
60 See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, No. 2, 1 HKC 425 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
61 id.
62 id.
63 Id.
64Id.
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Parliament. There were no constitutional grounds on which the courts in
Hong Kong could challenge the acts of the British Parliament. 65 Since the
transfer of sovereignty, however, Hong Kong's constitution has been the
Basic Law, a piece of Chinese national legislation. It was the first national
legislation, in addition to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
("PRC Constitution"), which was applied to Hong Kong by the NPC and has
an entrenched status.66 The Basic Law has a status at least equal to, if not
superior to, other Chinese national legislation.67 In order to determine
whether courts in Hong Kong can review the acts of the NPC or the NPCSC,
a close examination of Chinese constitutional jurisprudence is necessary.
Under the PRC Constitution, and in accordance with constitutional
theory, the NPC and the NPCSC are the highest organs of state power.
68
They have the authority to enact, interpret, and amend all national legislation
as long as they act in accordance with the PRC Constitution.69 In the case of
Hong Kong, the NPC, in enacting the Basic Law, has imposed certain
substantive and procedural restrictions upon itself with regard to the
interpretation and amendment of the Basic Law. 70 In Chinese constitutional
theory, such self-restrictive national legislation does not deprive the NPC or
the NPCSC of their constitutional authority to interpret or amend the Basic
Law.71  The NPC and the NPCSC have the constitutional authority to
interpret or amend the self-restrictive provisions of the Basic Law, provided
that such amendments are made in accordance with the Basic Law's
65 See generally WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 45.
6 Article 159 of the Basic Law has this effect. See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 159.67 Different scholarly views exist. But the Chinese legislature (i.e., the NPC and NPCSC) has not
made any decision as to whether the law made by the NPC has a higher status. In practice, they are treated
as having equal status in the Chinese legal system, even though the laws enacted by the NPC touch upon
issues of more fundamental importance. See CAI DINGJIAN, ZHONGGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI ZHIDU
[CHINESE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SYSTEM] 274-76 (1998).
6 See PRC Constitution, supra note 34, art. 57.
69 Id. arts. 62, 67.
70 Both substantive and procedural restrictions are provided in Article 159 of the Basic Law. The
substantive restriction is that no amendment shall contravene the established basic policies of China
regarding Hong Kong. The procedural restriction set out in Article 159(2) states the following:
the power to propose bills for amendments to this Law shall be vested in the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Amendment bills from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be submitted to the National People's Congress after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of
the deputies of the Region to the National People's Congress, two-thirds of all the members of
the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region.
See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 159.
71 See Wu Jianfan, Legal Basis for China's Top Legislature to Interpret Basic Law of Hong Kong,
CHINA L., Aug. 1999, 51-56.
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procedures.72 Application of the principle of the rule of law demands that
the NPC and the NPCSC comply with their own legislation, including those
self-restrictive provisions of the Basic Law, before amending the Basic Law
itself.
The Basic Law provides that among Chinese national laws, only the
Basic Law and the laws included in Appendix III of the Basic Law will be
enforced in Hong Kong.73 No other Chinese laws are applicable in Hong
Kong. Thus, the issue of the general compatibility of Chinese laws with the
Basic Law is unlikely to arise. Hence, we only need to examine whether the
CFA has the authority to evaluate the consistency of Chinese laws in
Appendix III with the Basic Law,74 and what the CFA can do if an
inconsistency exists.
From Hong Kong's perspective, the Basic Law is Hong Kong's
constitutional document and the highest law in the territory. Assuming that
the inclusion of Chinese national laws in Appendix III is lawful, 75 since all
the appendices are part of the Basic Law,76 it follows that all the laws in
Appendix III are also part of the Basic Law. It can thus be argued that all
the laws in Appendix III may be applied directly in Hong Kong and by its
courts. In practice, however, not all the Chinese laws included in Appendix
III are directly applicable in Hong Kong. Article 18 of the Basic Law
provides that the national laws listed in Appendix III shall be implemented
and applied in Hong Kong through either promulgation or through local
legislation.77 Of the ten Chinese laws included in Appendix III, eight have
been implemented through promulgation while two have been implemented
through local legislation.
7s
72 This is the consequence of applying the principle of the rule of law. The legislature should also
comply with the laws it enacts, notwithstanding its authority to abolish or amend the law.
See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 18(2).
7' Those national laws not listed in Appendix III are not applicable in Hong Kong. It follows that the
courts in Hong Kong cannot and need not interpret them.
75 As argued by one of my colleagues, it is possible to challenge the inclusion of a specific Chinese
law in Appendix III of the Basic Law because only those laws relating to the central-local relationship,
foreign relations, and national defense can be lawfully included in Appendix II. See Bing Ling, Can Hong
Kong Courts Review and Nullify Acts of the National People's Congress?, 29 HONG KONG L.J. 393 (1999).
'6 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxi Ling Di Ershiliu Hao [Order of the Chairman of the
People's Republic of China, No. 26] (issued Apr. 4, 1990), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Mar. 25, 1990,
at 73.
77 See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 18.
78 The two laws implemented through local legislation are the Law of the People's Republic of
China on the National Flag and the Law of the People's of Republic of China on the National Emblem.
Both have been implemented in Hong Kong through the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance of
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If a national law is implemented through promulgation and provisions
of that law are inconsistent with the Basic Law, one can argue that there is
an inconsistency between different provisions of the Basic Law. Then the
issue becomes how to resolve the conflict within the Basic Law. The answer
hinges upon the interpretation of the provisions concerned. Because all of
the laws included in Appendix III should relate to either the affairs of the
central government of the PRC79 or the central-local relationship, the CFA
should, according to Article 158(2) of the Basic Law, seek an interpretation
from the NPCSC before it issues a judgment interpreting these laws.s°
Another view treats the Basic Law and the national law at issue as two
different pieces of Chinese national legislation, leaving the inconsistency to
be resolved by some authority. The issue is whether the courts in Hong
Kong or the NPCSC should be that authority. According to the PRC
Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence, the Basic Law and all other
Chinese national laws have equal legal status within the Chinese legal
system. 8 When there are disputes concerning the interpretation of any piece
of national legislation or conflicts between different national laws, the NPC
and the NPCSC have the authority to resolve them. 2 But from Hong
Kong's perspective, the Basic Law, not the set of national laws in Appendix
III, is Hong Kong's constitutional document. It can be argued that the Basic
Law has a higher legal status in Hong Kong than any other national law.
According to Article 158 of the Basic Law, courts in Hong Kong should
have jurisdiction to accept cases concerning inconsistencies between the
national laws in Appendix III and the Basic Law.83 However, since all the
1997. National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance (adopted July 1, 1997) Cap. 2401, § 7, translated in
BLIS on Internet (visited May 14, 2000) <http://www.justice.gov.hk>.
79 These include both foreign affairs and national defense. See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 19.
8o The possibility exists that such an issue may arise when a case is before the Court of First Instance
or the Court of Appeal, as in the flag burning case. In such instances the trial of the case should be
suspended and a referral made by that court to the CFA requesting that the latter seek interpretation from
the NPCSC.
s1 See YI Guo LIANG ZHI YU XIANGGANG TEBIE XINGZHENQU JIBENFA [ONE COUNTRY TWO
SYSTEMS AND THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION] 73 (Xiao Weiyun
ed., 1990).
82 See PRC Constitution, supra note 34, art. 67(4). See also Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui
Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Falu Jieshi Gongzuo de Jueyi [Resolution of the NPCSC on
Strengthening the Work of Statutory Interpretation] (adopted June 10, 1981) art. 1, reprinted in ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU QUANSHU [COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA]
86 (Wang Huaian et al. eds, 1989).
83 Some eminent Chinese constitutional law scholars and Basic Law drafters have argued that Hong
Kong courts do not enjoy such authority under the Basic Law, not even the authority to review the
consistency between local legislation (ordinances) and the Basic Law. Such an approach clearly deprives
Hong Kong courts of the authority they enjoyed before the handover. See Xiao Weiyun et al., Why the
Court of Final Appeal Was Wrong: Comment of the Mainland Scholars on the Judgment of the Court of
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laws in Appendix III of the Basic Law relate to either affairs of the central
government of the PRC or to the central-local relationship, the CFA should
refer the issue to the NPCSC for an interpretation before issuing its own
judgment.
Regardless of whether we treat the conflict between the Basic Law
and a national law in Appendix III as a conflict between different provisions
of the Basic Law or as a conflict between two different national laws, the
result is the same. Two organs, the CFA and the NPCSC, will be involved
in determining whether a law listed in Appendix III is consistent with the
Basic Law. A special constitutional interpretive approach should be adopted
in order to give full consideration of the concepts of "two systems" and "one
country." In order to ensure the existence of "two systems," especially the
maintenance of a common law system in Hong Kong, the CFA should be
granted the authority to accept these legal disputes. However, the exercise
of such authority should be restricted in the case of legal actions relating to
the laws in Appendix III that concern either the affairs of the central
government of the PRC or the central-local relationship.8 4 In these cases, the
courts in Hong Kong should exercise their authority in accordance with the
procedures in Article 158(3) of the Basic Law and seek an interpretation
from the NPCSC before delivering a final judgment. The final
decisionmaking authority should be vested in the NPCSC, and its decision
should be followed by the CFA. Such an arrangement is reasonable because
the Basic Law is not only a Chinese national law but also Hong Kong's
constitutional document. The Basic Law is a bridge between the Chinese
civil law system and Hong Kong's common law system.
Chinese national laws, such as the Law of the People's Republic of
China on the National Flag ("PRC National Flag Law"), may also be
implemented in Hong Kong through local legislation. 5 If the power of
constitutional review enjoyed by the courts in Hong Kong before the
handover is to be maintained as promised by the Basic Law,8 these courts
Final Appeal, in HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION, supra note
27, at 53.
84 Otherwise, the national law in dispute should not be included in Appendix IIl in the first place. It
is possible, as has been argued by Mr. Bing Ling, that an action can be brought that challenges the validity
of the inclusion of a national law in Appendix III. If that is the case, the case will focus on whether or not
the substance of the national law at issue concerns affairs of the central government or the central-local
relationship. The final authority to make such a decision lies with the NPCSC. See Bing Ling, supra note
75. 85 See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 18(l).
86 It has been argued under the Basic Law that the common law system in the HKSAR must be
maintained. Accordingly, the constitutional review authority of the HKSAR courts should also be
maintained.
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must have the authority to review local legislation for consistency with the
Basic Law. In a recent case on the issue of flag-burning, for example, the
Hong Kong courts were asked to review the legality of Section 7 of the
National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance (Ordinance No. 116 of 1997)
and Section 7 of the Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance
(Ordinance No. 117 of 1997), both of which criminalize public flag-burning
activities.8 7 It was alleged in the case that both ordinances were inconsistent
with Article 16 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Article 39 of the Basic
Law.8   Courts in Hong Kong should have the authority to determine
whether or not both ordinances are consistent with Article 39 of the Basic
Law.8 9 However, the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance is not
ordinary local legislation. Section 7 of the Ordinance is the local equivalent
of a similar provision, Article 19 of the PRC National Flag Law, which is
included in Appendix III of the Basic Law.90 Assuming that inclusion of
this law in Appendix III is lawful, Article 19 should relate exclusively to
either the affairs of the central government of the PRC or the central-local
relationship.9' If the interpretation of Article 19 affects the decision of the
CFA in its final adjudication, the CFA should seek an interpretation from the
NPCSC. In the actual case, however, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal held
87 "A person who desecrates the national flag or national emblem by publicly and willfully burning,
mutilating, scrawling on, defiling or trampling on it commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine
at level 5 and to imprisonment for 3 years." National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance, supra note 78,
§ 7.
A person who desecrates the regional flag or regional emblem by publicly and willfully burning,
mutilating, scrawling on, defiling or trampling on it commits an offence and is liable: (a) on conviction on
indictment to a fine at level 5 and to imprisonment for 3 years; and (b) on summary conviction to a fine at
level 3 and to imprisonment for 1 year. Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance (adopted July 1,
1997) Cap. 2601, § 7, translated in BLIS on Internet (visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.justice.gov.hk>.
88 See HKSAR v. Ng Kung-siu, 2 HKC 10 (Eastern Magistracy 1998), available in LEXIS, Hong
Kong Cases.
89 An example of the exercise of this authority by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeal
can be seen in the flag-burning case. See id.
90 The Law of the PRC on the National Flag was enacted by the NPCSC on June 28, 1990, and took
effect on October 1, 1990. Article 19 of that law provides:
Whoever desecrates the National Flag of the People's Republic of China by publicly and
willfully burning, mutilating, scrawling on, defiling or trampling upon it shall be investigated for
criminal responsibilities according to law; where the offence is relatively minor, he shall be
detained for not more than 15 days by the public security organ in reference to the provisions of
the Regulations on Administrative Penalties for Public Security.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoqifa [Law of the People's Republic of China on the National Flag]
(adopted June 28, 1990) art. 19, translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1990-1992
65 (1993).
9' As discussed before, the legality of the inclusion of the law in Appendix III can be challenged on
the issue of both the procedure of incorporation and the substance of the law. See Bing Ling, supra note
75.
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that Section 7 of the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance was
inconsistent with the Basic Law.92 The implication of this holding is that
Article 19 of the PRC National Flag Law is inconsistent with Article 39 of
the Basic Law.
Since the decision of the Court of Appeal is not yet final, the court is
not obligated under the Basic Law to seek an interpretation from the NPCSC
before it delivers its judgment.93 But when the case is presented to the CFA,
as has happened in the right of abode case, the CFA is obligated to seek an
interpretation from the NPCSC before it makes a final decision.
C. Comments
The analysis above leads to the conclusion that regardless of how a
Chinese national law is implemented in Hong Kong, any challenge to the
legality or validity of a provision of that law should be referred to the
NPCSC for interpretation if the case reaches the CFA. If a provision of the
Chinese law were challenged before the courts in Hong Kong, the
interpretation would certainly affect the final decision of the court.9 4 This is
a logical and reasonable solution because it is not only consistent with
Chinese constitutional jurisprudence, but also maintains the adjudicative
autonomy of the courts in Hong Kong. Moreover, this approach allows for
the consideration of both Hong Kong's common law approach and the
Chinese civil law approach.
One remaining problem, however, is that the Basic Law only
authorizes the CFA to seek interpretation from the NPCSC.95 In most cases,
a referral to the NPCSC for interpretation is only possible after two
appeals.9 6 This causes much delay in making a final decision, and as a result
the parties concerned face a long period of uncertainty. It is also a waste of
97judicial and Legal Aid resources. A wiser and more effective process
would make the referral discretionary when the case is heard by the court of
first instance. In this regard, European Union law and its rich case
92 See Ng Kung-siu, 2 HKC 10.
93 This was confirmed by the CFA in the right of abode case. See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of
Immigration, I HKC 291 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong
Cases.
94 Otherwise, the plaintiff would not have standing to bring the case before the court in the first
place.
95 See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 158.
9 The flag-burning case was heard by the District Court, the Court of Appeal, and the CFA. The
CFA delivered its judgment on December 15, 1999 without seeking an interpretation from the NPCSC.
97 Thus far, most of the cases relating to the Basic Law have been funded through Legal Aid.
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precedents provide important guidance.98 Such borrowing is also logical
given the fact that the intent of the drafters of Article 158 of the Basic Law
was to create a referral mechanism similar to that of the European Union.
99
However, establishing such a mechanism will not be possible until Article
158(3) is amended.
IV. RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE BASIC LAW BY THE NPCSC
A. Re-Interpretation Versus Amendment
Shortly after delivery of its judgment in the right of abode case, the
CFA issued a statement of clarification. 100 However, the clarification failed
to prevent the escalation of Hong Kong's constitutional crisis. Shortly after
the clarification, the Hong Kong government announced the results of its
preliminary study of the impact of the CFA's judgment. It found that strict
implementation of the CFA's judgment would lead to the influx of
approximately 1.6 million Mainland Chinese into Hong Kong.' 01 Such a
dramatic population increase was not acceptable to either the Hong Kong
government or to the general public. Therefore, something had to be done
about the CFA's decision. This problem has fostered the debate between
those who advocate amendment of the Basic Law by the NPC and those who
support re-interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2) of the Basic Law by the
NPCSC.10 2  A sharp conflict exists among scholars, legislators, and legal
practitioners in Hong Kong with regard to the legality, as well as the pros
and cons, of amendment versus re-interpretation of the Basic Law.
Proponents of amending the Basic Law strongly oppose seeking re-
interpretation of the Basic Law from the NPCSC for three principal reasons.
First, re-interpretation of the Basic Law would damage the judicial
independence and final adjudicative authority of the CFA. 103  Second, re-
" For a detailed discussion of the referral system under the EEC law and relevant cases, see T.C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 261-302 (3d ed. 1994).
99 See Essay 2, supra note 27, at 116-17. See also YASH GHAI, supra note 4, at 200.
'00 The statement of clarification was issued by the CFA on February 26, 1999 upon the request of the
Hong Kong government.
101 See Report on Seeking Assistance, supra note 31.
102 The issue of the appropriateness of amendment versus re-interpretation by the NPCSC was raised
at the beginning of the constitutional crisis. However, the Hong Kong government's announcement that
1.6 million people may come to Hong Kong has helped to focus the debate on this issue.
103 The Hong Kong Bar Association argued in its letter to the Chief Executive as follows:
Article 24 quite plainly is an article which deals solely with the internal affairs of Hong Kong,
namely, the right of abode of people of Hong Kong, who those people are and what rights they
enjoy. Any attempt to make a reference to the NPCSC involving an interpretation of Article 24
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interpretation by the NPCSC would overturn the CFA's decision and would
be tantamount to repudiating not only the concept of "one country, two
systems," but also the high degree of autonomy guaranteed by the Basic
Law.1°4 Third, re-interpretation would seriously and irreversibly damage the
rule of law in Hong Kong. 105 It has been argued that law is supposed to be
above politics. 0 6 But by seeking re-interpretation, the NPCSC, as a political
body, will be drawn into the process of interpretation by the Hong Kong
government.' °7  It is understandable that lawyers with common law
backgrounds have expressed these concerns because they have been trained
to believe that the judiciary is the only institution that should interpret
legislation.
On the other hand, the Hong Kong government and many others favor
re-interpretation, rather than amendment, of the Basic Law. 10 8  Supporters
have offered numerous arguments to bolster their position. First, the Basic
Law grants interpretive authority to the NPCSC under Article 158(1).
Second, rather than overruling the CFA's decision, the Hong Kong
government merely wants to prevent the CFA's decision from becoming
precedent. 09 This argument is based on the Basic Law's constitutional
structure, which grants the CFA the power of final adjudication but not the
power of final statutory interpretation." l0 Third, preventing the CFA's
would be contrary at least to the spirit of Article 158 which makes it necessary only to refer
questions relating to matters other than the internal affairs of Hong Kong to the NPCSC. Where
the CFA, being a court of final adjudication, has exercised its jurisdiction properly to interpret
Article 24, such an attempt would effectively remove its power to finally adjudicate on matters
concerning the internal affairs of Hong Kong. That would be contrary to Articles 2 and 19 of the
Basic Law which guarantee independent judicial power of the local courts including that of final
adjudication.
An attempt to make a more limited reference based on Article 22 only is no less damaging. The
result would be that the CFA would lose its status as a court of final adjudication. That will not
only destroy the concept of high autonomy which is to be enjoyed by Hong Kong but also the
independence, authority and reputation the CFA has established since the Handover.
Letter from the Hong Kong Bar Association to the Chief Executive (May 5, 1999) <http://www.hkba.org/press-
release/19990909.htm> [hereinafter Letter from the Hong Kong Bar Association].
104 id.
1o3 Id.
106 id.
10' See Much More Than an Interpretation Is at Stake, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 27, 1999, at
10.
0s The influential scholars include Professor Albert Chen, the Dean of the Law Faculty at the
University of Hong Kong, who is also a member of the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, Ms. Maria Tam, who is a member of the same committee, Professor Peter
Wesley-Smith, another leading constitutional scholar in Hong Kong, and several senior counsels.
See Ian Wingfield, The NPCSC Will Not Become Super Referee, HONG KONG ECON. DAILY, June
14, 1999, at A21.
110 See id.
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judgment from becoming judicial precedent would not damage judicial
independence in Hong Kong. 1' This argument is based on the fact that
before the handover, both the British Parliament and the local legislature
could enact legislation that prevented a Hong Kong court's judgment from
becoming precedent. In Great Britain, there are many examples of
Parliament enacting legislation to stop the implementation of judgments of
the judiciary, including judgments of the House of Lords. 2  No
constitutional crisis ever arose out of that practice, nor did anyone argue that
Britain's judicial independence had been compromised. However, one may
argue that Hong Kong's situation before 1997 was different because it did
not have a constitution. Fourth, re-interpretation would be retroactive to the
date the Basic Law came into effect, July 1, 1997,113 while amendment of
the Basic Law would only be triggered from the effective date of the
amendments. Fifth, amendment of the Basic Law could only occur at the
next NPC plenary meeting, while re-interpretation by the NPCSC could be
undertaken much sooner.' '4 Sixth, the Basic Law should not be amended
because the Basic Law itself did not cause the crisis. The crisis began when
the CFA misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the Basic Law."
5
In order to discuss whether re-interpretation or amendment is the
better solution, it is necessary to first examine the conditions under which re-
interpretation or amendment should be sought. The need for interpretation
arises when an ambiguity or uncertainty exists regarding the exact meaning
of a specific provision in a piece of legislation," 6 whereas amendment is
required when legislation is badly drafted, outdated, or simply wrong.' '7 If
ambiguity exists, re-interpretation by the NPCSC is the more appropriate
option. In other cases, amendment should be sought. Differences of opinion
exist, however, even on this initial issue."
II1 Id.
112 See Burmah Oil v. Lord Advocate [1965] App. Cas. 75.
113 This view was reiterated by Ms. Maria Tam after the NPCSC issued its interpretation of the Basic
Law. See Pan Xiao Ping, Renda Shefa Guochen Xianshi Aihu Xianggang [The Interpretation of the
NPCSC Shows the Care ofHong Kong], WENHuI DAILY, July 3, 1999, at 8.
1"4 See Gangu Yao, Renda Jieshi Juquan Zilu Jianzhi Ershi Wan [The Number of Children for Right
ofAbode for Whom the HKSAR Seeks Interpretation from the NPCSC Decreases to 200,000], MING PAO,
May 19, 1999, at Al.
115 See Ian Wingfield, The Interpretation of the NPCSC Should Stick to the Original Legislative
Intent, HONG KONG EcON. DAILY, June 1, 1999, at A22.
116 See J. BELL & SIR GEORGE ENGLE, CROSS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (3d ed. 1995). See
also F. BENION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 15-16 (3d ed. 1997).
117 See BENION, supra note 116, at 210-20.
118 Those in favor of re-interpretation argue that it is the CFA that misunderstood the relevant
provisions of the Basic Law and that there is nothing wrong with the Basic Law. They insist that the
controversy can be settled by re-interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law by the NPCSC.
However, those in favor of amendment argue that the two relevant provisions of the Basic Law, Articles
MAY 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
On the one hand, the CFA holds that the phrase "people from other
parts of China" in Article 22(4) should not include permanent residents of
Hong Kong."l9 On the other hand, before their status as permanent residents
is established and confirmed by the relevant authority, those applicants still
have residential registration somewhere in Mainland China. Their
residential registration is removed after they obtain the appropriate approval
to come to Hong Kong. The applicants in the right of abode case had not
obtained such approval at the time of litigation. Thus, it is reasonable to
treat them as "people from other parts of China." Ambiguity exists as to the
meaning of "people from other parts of China" in Article 22(4). Therefore,
interpretation is the better way to resolve the issue.
With regard to Article 24(2) and Article 24(3), however, it is clear that
no conditions are attached to classification as a permanent resident or
entitlement to the right of abode. The CFA's interpretation is consistent
with the law's literal meaning. If the Hong Kong government wants those
two provisions to contain certain conditions, it is better to seek amendment;
otherwise the literal meaning of Article 24(2) and Article 24(3) would be
strained.
The Basic Law is, however, a piece of Chinese legislation. Under
Chinese constitutional theory and jurisprudence, the NPCSC has the sole
authority to interpret all Chinese national laws. Two centuries ago,
legislative interpretation was one of the prominent characteristics of the
continental legal system, which was based on Roman law. 120 China is one of
the few countries in which legislative interpretation still exists.21
Legislative interpretation in China can either supplement a national law or
clarify its meaning.1 22  Examination of the limited theory and practice of
22(4) and 24(2), are clear and that the CFA has properly interpreted them. Backers of amendment argue
that if Hong Kong's government wants to give the two provisions meanings which are different from their
plain meanings, it is better to amend the Basic Law. See Letter from the Hong Kong Bar Association,
supra note 103.
11 See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, 1 HKC 291 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
120 For a detailed discussion of the concept of legislative interpretation, see J.H. MERRYMAN, THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION 20-36 (2d ed. 1985). For a discussion of the influence of the continental legal
system on China, see Wang Guiguo, The Development of Legislative Interpretation, HONG KONG L., Aug.
1999, at 49-53.
121 In Europe, Turkey had legislative interpretation until its constitution abolished it in 1961. Taiwan
still retains legislative interpretation. However, a majority of countries under continental legal systems,
including leading countries such as France and Germany, have given up legislative interpretation. See
MERRYMAN, supra note 120, at 39-47.
122 These two functions of legislative interpretation are explicitly provided for by the Resolution of
the NPCSC on Strengthening Interpretation of the Law, which was adopted in 1981. Some Chinese
scholars have argued that a legislative interpretation also has a third function of amending a national law.
See Cai Dingjian & Liu Xinghong, Lun Li Fa Jieshi [Analysis of Legislative Interpretation], ZHONGGUO
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legislative interpretation in China shows that legislation can be interpreted in
a manner that either expands or narrows a law's meaning. 123 Furthermore,
the NPCSC has no established procedure or format for legislative
interpretation. Historically, the NPCSC has followed legislative procedures,
although the forms of interpretation issued are described as interpretations,
decisions, explanations, and others.1
24
With respect to Article 24(2), the Preparatory Committee for the
establishment of the HKSAR125 adopted an opinion in August 1996 that was
later approved by the NPCSC. 126  That opinion narrowly interprets Article
24(2) of the Basic Law and, through that interpretation, incorporates a
restriction not expressly stated in the Basic Law. 127 This restriction provides
that only children born to those who reside lawfully in Hong Kong may rely
on Article 24(2) to claim the right of abode. In the Chinese legal system,
this is an acceptable means of interpreting national legislation. However, the
CFA has failed to give effect to this opinion. Therefore, it can reasonably be
FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL Sci.] no. 6, at 37-38 (1993). However, this view is not accepted by many other
Chinese scholars. See, e.g., Lin Laifan et al., An Analysis of the Legislative Interpretation System in the
PRC, HONG KONG L., Aug. 1999, at 56-61.
123 See Zhang Zhiming, Zhongguo De Falu Jieshi Tizhi [China's Legal Interpretation Mechanism], in
FALU JIESHI WENTI [ISSUES ON LEGAL INTERPRETATION] 182 (Liang Zhiping ed., 1998).
24 Id. at 210-15. See also Cai Dingjian & Liu Xinghong, supra note 122, at 40-42.
125 This committee was established by the NPC to do preparatory work for the establishment of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
126 This opinion was approved by the NPCSC in 1997. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui
Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Pizhun Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu
Choubei Weiyuanhui Jishu Gongzuo de Yijian de Jueding [Decision of the National People's Congress
Standing Committee to Approve the Opinion of the National People's Congress Preparatory Committee for
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU
QUANSHU [COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 17 (Wang Huaian et. al eds.,
1997).
127 The opinion states:
Paragraph 2 of art. 24 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China provides for issues concerning permanent residents of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). For the purpose of implementing the
provisions, the following opinions are hereby provided for the HKSAR to formulate the details
of the implementation rules.
Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong as provided in Category (1) of Paragraph 2 of art. 24 of the
Basic Law refer to people who are born during which either one or both of their parents were
lawfully residing in Hong Kong, but excluding those who are born to illegal immigrants,
overstayers or people residing temporarily in Hong Kong.
See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Choubei Weiyuanhui Guanyu Shishi
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa Di Ershisi Tiao Di Er Kuan de
Yijian [Opinion of the National People's Congress Preparatory Committee for the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region on Article 24(2) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law]
(issued Aug. 8, 1996), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO [GAZETrE
OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Aug. 23, 1996, at 941-43.
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argued that the CFA erred by failing to give effect to the legislative intent of
the Basic Law. Here, legislative intent refers to the intent as explained in the
opinion approved by the NPCSC.1
28
With regard to amending the Basic Law, both sides agree that
amendment is a possible solution. The Hong Kong government did not
choose this approach mainly because it believes that amendment takes too
long. 129 This rationale, however, appears unconvincing. If the Hong Kong
government wants to implement the CFA's judgment, interim administrative
measures could be adopted until the NPC holds its plenary session. Perhaps
the actual reason the Hong Kong government decided against amendment
was its concern that amendment of the Basic Law would not stop the influx
of 1.6 million Mainland Chinese.
For those countries using legislative interpretation, including China, a
legislative interpretation is the most authoritative interpretation of the law.
130
From the moment a legislative interpretation is made, ambiguous phrases in
the law at issue assume the meaning given by the legislative interpretation.
Although a legislative interpretation would not have retroactive effect for the
parties involved in the right of abode case, it would be retroactive in the
sense that it would have the same legal effect as the Basic Law, which
became effective on July 1, 1997.131 If the alternative of amendment of the
Basic Law were adopted, the 1.6 million Mainland Chinese who according
to the CFA's judgment enjoy the right of abode in Hong Kong would be
entitled to reside in Hong Kong permanently until the amendment is made.
Although it is legally feasible for the Hong Kong government to wait to
amend the Basic Law, ultimately the amendment may not be able to satisfy
the objective of the Hong Kong government and the wishes of the majority
of Hong Kong's people, which is to stem the influx of Mainland Chinese.'
32
128 However, there are procedural provisions that address the problem of what can be done if the CFA
misinterprets the Basic Law. According to common law tradition, the legislature can stop the decision of
the court from becoming precedent by amending the law at issue. This is exactly what the side in favor of
amendment has argued for.
129 It has been suggested that amendment of the Basic Law has its problems. One implication is that
the interpretation by the CFA of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law is correct. Amendment of the
Basic Law actually means that the HKSAR Government has changed its policy and that the government is
required to compensate those harmed by the policy change. The second is that an amendment of the Basic
Law cannot'contradict China's basic policies towards the HKSAR as embodied in the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law. See Alan Hoo, XING BAO, May 14, 1999, at 7.
130 See Xiao Weiyun et al., supra note 83.
131 A legislative amendment is not retroactive and only comes into effect at the time the amendment
is properly made. See MERRYMAN, supra note 120, at 28.
132 This point has also been admitted by Mr. Wingfield, a senior legal officer with the Department of
Justice of the Hong Kong government. See Wingfield, supra note 109.
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B. The Appropriateness of Seeking Re-Interpretation
If the argument that the CFA misinterpreted the Basic Law in the right
of abode case stands, then the NPCSC's re-interpretation simply states the
"correct" meaning of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law. This re-
interpretation is considered applicable from the date the Basic Law came
into effect. 133 This Article now examines in greater detail the Hong Kong
government's justifications for and the appropriateness of seeking re-
interpretation from the NPCSC.
The authority to interpret the Basic Law is expressly stated in Article
158, which allows the NPCSC to retain the ultimate power to interpret the
Basic Law. 134 However, in adjudication of cases relating to the Basic Law,
the NPCSC has delegated its authority to the CFA. 135 The CFA has been
entrusted with the final authority to interpret those provisions that fall within
Hong Kong's autonomy.' 36  Even for those provisions of law and issues
falling outside the scope of Hong Kong's authority, such as those within the
authority of the central government of the PRC or those concerning the
central-local relationship, the CFA may exercise its interpretive authority
unless the interpretation would affect the outcome of the case.' 37 Within a
well-established legal system, a reasonable interpretation of Article 158
would be that the NPCSC's authority to interpret the Basic Law is extremely
limited. Without a request from the CFA, the NPCSC should not interpret
the Basic Law. If this were not the case, no adjudication by the CFA would
ever be final.'
38
The Chinese legal system, however, is not well developed. China is
one of the few countries that has retained legislative interpretation. Under
Chinese constitutional jurisprudence, the concept of authorization differs
133 This is also a consequence of legislative interpretation. See MERRYMAN, supra note 120, at 40-41;
see also Wu Jianfan, Legal Basis for China's Top Legislature to Interpret Basic Law of Hong Kong, CHINA
L., Aug. 1999, at 51.
See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 158(1).
"3 Id. art. 158(2).
136 See id.
137 See Dennis Chang, The Basis of the Basic Law Is Threatened, MING PAO, June 28, 1999, at B15.
See also Hong Kong Bar Ass'n, A Constitutionally Acceptable Solution (press release) (May 13, 1999), in
YIGUO LIANGZHI YU XIANGGANG JIBEN FALU ZHIDU [ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS AND THE BASIC LEGAL
SYSTEM IN HONG KONG] 31 (Xiao Weiyun ed., 1990); Guo HUACHENG, FALU JIESHI BLJIAO YANJIU
[COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION] 250-52 (1993).
138 An argument has been raised that the CFA's authority of final adjudication does not deprive the
NPCSC of its interpretation authority, and that final adjudication is restricted to each specific case and does
not equal final interpretation. Under a common law system, such an argument does not stand because the
essence of common law is that the ratio decidendi of a case, i.e., the statement of a legal principle or rule,
will be binding. Final authority of adjudication should mean that the ratio decidendi stated by the CFA
should be final, unless it is reversed properly through legislation or legislative amendment.
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from that of separation of powers. 139 Authorization means that the power-
holder allows others to exercise power under defined conditions, but that its
power is not reduced as a result.1 40 The authorization is conditional. One of
the conditions under which the Hong Kong courts were given interpretive
authority was that the courts in Hong Kong must respect the original
legislative intent of the Basic Law. 141 Though the validity of this condition
is highly questionable, the argument that authorization does not equal
relinquishment of authority is well received in Chinese constitutional theory
and by scholars. 42  It is also supported by practice. 143  Under Chinese
constitutional jurisprudence, the NPCSC may invoke Article 158(1) to
interpret the Basic Law, provided there are no explicit statutory restrictions.
However, the Basic Law imposes explicit restrictions on the NPCSC's
exercise of general interpretive authority under Article 158(1). First, the
NPCSC can only interpret those provisions of the Basic Law concerning
either the responsibility of the central government or the relationship
between the central government and the HKSAR. Second, the NPCSC will
exercise its interpretation authority under Article 158(1) of the Basic Law
only when the interpretation would affect the judgment of the case at issue
and upon the request of the CFA.
The two provisions submitted to the NPCSC for re-interpretation are
Article 22(4) and Article 24(2) of the Basic Law. Article 22 is in Chapter 2
of the Basic Law, which addresses the relationship between the central
government of the PRC and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
It is primarily concerned with the central-local relationship.
In the right of abode case, the Director of the Immigration Department
did not request the CFA to seek interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)
from the NPCSC according to Article 158. 44 Counsel for the Hong Kong
139 See Wu Jianfan, supra note 133, at 53.
140 Id.
141 Although this condition cannot be found in the Basic Law, Professor Wu argues that this is an
extremely important condition and goes without saying. See id.
142 Scholars who share this view include Professor Xu Chongde and Professor Xiao Weiyun. See
Xiao Weiyun, supra note 83.
143 In 1985, the NPCSC authorized the State Council to enact legislation relating to economic reform
and the opening of China to the outside world, but the NPCSC has not stopped passing laws on this subject.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Di Liu Jie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Di San Ci Huiyi Guanyu
Shouquan Guowuyuan Zai Jingji Tizhi Gaige he Duiwai Kaifang Mian Keyi Zhiding Zanxing de Guiding
Huozhe Tiaoli de Jueding [Decision of the Third Session of the Sixth National People's Congress of the
People's Republic of China on Authorizing the State Council to Formulate Interim Provisions or
Regulations Concerning the Reform of the Economic Structure and the Open Policy] (adopted Apr. 10,
1985), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU QUANSHU, supra note 82, at 86-87.
14 Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Final Appeal Nos. 14-16, 1 HKC 291 (Hong Kong Court
of Final Appeal 1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
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government pointed out that he had raised the issue for the CFA's
consideration. 45  Some scholars have argued that the CFA adopted an
incorrect test to decide whether or not a referral should be made.146 The test
adopted by the CFA asked whether the substance of the issue to be
interpreted dealt with a matter that must be referred. If not, there could be
no referral. The question of substance is a question solely for the CFA. As
a result, the CFA concluded that it would only make a referral if (1) a
provision of the Basic Law concerns either the exclusive affairs of the
central government or the central-local relationship, and (2) the
interpretation of that provision would affect the outcome of the case.' 47 This
approach has been strongly criticized by some scholars, who have argued
that examination of the legislative history of Article 158 demonstrates that
the Basic Law's drafters intended to incorporate into the Basic Law a
referral mechanism similar to that of the European Union legal system.
148
Borrowing from the approach of European Union law, the drafters intended
a referral to be made when an interpretation of the Basic Law is necessary to
enable the court to decide a case.149 Professor Albert Chen, in one of his
essays, conducted an in-depth analysis of the test that should be adopted in
making a referral. Chen argues convincingly that the interpretation of
Article 22(4) was necessary for the CFA to make the judgment, although
Article 22(4) was not the "predominant provision." Accordingly, the CFA
adopted the wrong test. 50
Article 24(2), which is located in Chapter 3 of the Basic Law, deals
with the fundamental rights and duties of residents of Hong Kong. Such
topics are clearly within Hong Kong's autonomy, a point that the counsel for
the Hong Kong government conceded in the right of abode case.' 5' It
follows that the CFA, not the NPCSC, has the final authority to interpret that
provision. However, the NPCSC has already interpreted Article 24(2). The
NPCSC indicated in its re-interpretation that the only reason for its
interpretation of Article 24(2) was the CFA's misinterpretation of Article
22(4).152 This decision raises two further interrelated legal questions. First,
145 See Chang, supra note 137.
146 See Essay 1, supra note 27.
147 See Hong Kong Bar Ass'n, Bar Statement on the Court of Final Appeal Right of Abode Cases
(Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.hkba.org/press-release/hom.htm>. See also see Ng Ka Ling v. Director of
Immigration, Final Appeal Nos. 14-16, 1 HKC 291 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 1999), available in
LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
148 See Essay 1, supra note 27.
149 See id. at 5.
Io Id.
"5' See Chang, supra note 137; see also NgKa Ling, 1 HKC 291.52 See supra note 36.
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can the NPCSC's belief that the CFA misinterpreted the Basic Law be a
ground for the NPCSC's re-interpretation, and who makes such a decision?
Second, what role can the Hong Kong government play if it believes that the
CFA misinterpreted the Basic Law?
Article 158 of the Basic Law only states that the NPCSC enjoys the
final authority of interpretation. It does not specify misinterpretation of the
Basic Law by the CFA as a ground for the NPCSC to exercise its general
interpretation authority. If misinterpretation of the Basic Law by the courts
in Hong Kong is a ground for the NPCSC to initiate interpretation, an
institution must be designated to decide whether the courts in Hong Kong,
particularly the CFA, have misinterpreted the Basic Law. 153 Currently, the
Basic Law does not indicate which organ has the authority to determine
whether or not the CFA has misinterpreted the Basic Law. It is reasonable
to say that the draftsmen of the Basic Law did not foresee the possibility that
the CFA might not submit a provision of the Basic Law which should be
submitted for interpretation, or that the CFA might have misinterpreted the
Basic Law. 154 Accordingly, it can be argued that the Basic Law does not
foresee misinterpretation as a basis for the NPCSC to exercise its statutory
interpretative authority under Article 158(1) of the Basic Law.
Assuming that the CFA misinterpreted the Basic Law or made a
mistake by not referring it when it should have, can the Hong Kong
government do anything about it? Article 158 of the Basic Law does not
give the executive branch a role in the interpretation of the Basic Law. The
executive branch should have requested that the CFA seek interpretation
from the NPCSC in the right of abode case, but the Hong Kong government
did not do so. After the CFA issued its interpretation, the only justification
that could have been invoked by the Hong Kong government to seek re-
interpretation from the NPCSC was the constitutional principle of necessity.
But the application of this principle first requires the exhaustion of all other
possible alternatives. 155 Throughout the constitutional crisis, the Hong Kong
government failed to prove that it exhausted all other alternatives before
seeking interpretation from the NPCSC.1 56 The Hong Kong government
153 Scholars trained in Chinese law may argue that the NPCSC's final authority of interpretation
should include the authority to decide whether or not the CFA has misinterpreted the Basic Law.
154 Professor Wu Jianfan, a draftsman of the Basic Law, has argued that this is an implied ground for
the NPCSC to exercise its statutory interpretation authority under Article 158(1). See Wu Jianfan, supra
note 133, at 53.
'55 For Chief Justice John Marshall's discussion of the principle of necessity, see McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). See also JACK RuTL, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1305-
07 (1986).
136 The HKSAR Government has failed to explain why it could not have adopted certain
administrative measures while the Basic Law was being amended.
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missed the best opportunity to make such a request during the adjudicative
process in the right of abode case. If the Hong Kong government had made
the request and the CFA had rejected it, it would have been more legally
persuasive to invoke the principle of necessity to seek re-interpretation from
the NPCSC through the State Council.
The debate about the appropriateness of seeking re-interpretation from
the NPCSC also concerns the more fundamental issue of whether the
constitutional structure established by the Basic Law is appropriate for Hong
Kong, and whether that structure is capable of maintaining Hong Kong's
common law system. More specifically, should the CFA be granted the final
authority of adjudication or the final authority to interpret the Basic Law?
The harsh reality is that every person or institution, including the courts,
may be criticized by others for making decisions that are regarded as wrong.
Due to their impartiality, however, the courts in Hong Kong are the least
likely to make biased decisions.157 There is every reason to believe that the
courts in Hong Kong, rather than the NPCSC (a political organ), are the
most qualified institutions to faithfully interpret the Basic Law. If there is
faith in the courts in Hong Kong, then there must be a willingness to pay the
price for that faith, which is the possibility of undesirable or unpopular
judgments. Moreover, checks and balances exist between the courts in Hong
Kong and the NPC because the NPC has the power to amend the Basic Law
and prevent the implementation of CFA judgments. 58
The discussion above reveals that the Hong Kong government's
decision to seek interpretation from the NPCSC was the only solution, since
amendment of the Basic Law will not stop the population influx.' 59 When
compared with the Basic Law for the Macao Special Administrative Region,
it is easy to see that the poor drafting of Article 24 of the Basic Law is the
actual source of the escalating constitutional crisis in Hong Kong.'
60
157 See Hong Kong Bar Ass'n, An Open Letter to the Citizens of Hong Kong on the Right ofAbode
Case (May 14, 1999) <http://www.hkba.org/press-release/home.htm>.
'5 Article 159 of the Basic Law provides a detailed procedure for the amendment of the Basic Law.
See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 159.
159 See Huang Qinkang, Fanbo Hong Qintian Xtansheng De Zizhe [Rebutting Mr. Hong Qintian 's
Accusation], MING PAO, June 2, 1999, at A32. This commentary was written by a lawyer at the
Department of Justice and represents the Hong Kong government's position.
'60 See Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
Article 24, which provides:
The permanent residents of the Macao Special Administrative Region shall be:
(1) Chinese citizens born in Macao before or after the establishment of the Macao Special
Administrative Region and their children of Chinese nationality born outside Macao;
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However, the Hong Kong government will not admit this point. Instead, it
must find legal justifications for requesting that the NPCSC interpret
Articles 22 and 24. The Hong Kong government's current justifications are
not convincing and cannot withstand close scrutiny. When its justifications
are criticized, the government proposes different justifications. The
constitutional crisis has finally reached a stage at which the most sensitive
constitutional issue, the legality of the NPCSC's interpretation, needs to be
examined and resolved.16 1  In order to stop the influx of 1.6 million
Mainland Chinese, the Hong Kong government has put itself in the
disadvantageous position of defending the flawed Basic Law. It has tried to
assure the Hong Kong people and the legal profession that only under
extreme circumstances will it seek interpretation from the NPCSC, which
only rarely exercises its interpretive authority. 162 However, such assurances
have no legal substance. As one scholar argued, if the interpretation is
(2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Macao for a continuous period of not less
than seven years before or after the establishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region
and their children of Chinese nationality born outside Macao after they have become permanent
residents;
(3) The Portuguese who were born in Macao and have taken Macao as their place of permanent
residence before or after the establishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region;
(4) The Portuguese who have ordinarily resided in Macao for a continuous period of not less
than 7 years and have taken Macao as their place of permanent residence before or after the
establishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region;
(5) Other persons who have ordinarily resided in Macao for a continuous period of not less than
7 years and have taken Macao as their place of permanent residence before or after the
establishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region;
(6) Persons under 18 years of age bom in Macao of those residents listed in category (5) before
or after the establishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region.
The above-mentioned residents shall have the right of abode in the Macao Special
Administrative Region and shall be qualified to obtain permanent identity cards.
Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Aomen Tebie Xinzhengqu Jibenfa [Basic Law of the Macao Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated Mar. 31, 1993) art. 24,
translated as Macau Basic Law, in University of Macao Homepage (visited Apr. 29, 2000)
<http://www.umac.mo/basiclaw/english/ch3.html>.
161 This is a very complex issue and deserves another article for detailed discussion.
162 Including this interpretation by the NPCSC of the Basic Law, the NPCSC has at most exercised its
legislative interpretation authority nine times. For discussion of the first six, see Cai Dingjian & Liu
Xinghong, supra note 122, at 41. On the three most recent occasions the NPCSC has issued what it calls
"interpretations." Two of these are the interpretations of the NPCSC on the application of the Nationality
Law in Hong Kong and Macao, respectively. The last one is the most recent interpretation of the Basic
Law.
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legitimate and necessary, then whenever there is such a necessity, the Hong
Kong government will make an interpretation request.
163
V. THE NPCSC's INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
The NPCSC's interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2) states that the
CFA failed to refer these two provisions of the Basic Law for interpretation
as required by Article 158(3) of the Basic Law, and that the CFA's
interpretation was inconsistent with the original legislative intent of the
Basic Law. 64 The NPCSC's interpretation clearly states that it must be
followed by all the courts in Hong Kong.' 65 Moreover, this requirement was
affirmed by the CFA itself in its statement of clarification in the right of
abode case. 166  If the legality of an interpretation by the NPCSC were
accepted, then the interpretation of the NPCSC would have the same legal
effect as the Basic Law itself.' 67  But one important theoretical question
remains: which part of the NPCSC's interpretation is binding, only the
decisions on Articles 22(4) and 24(2), or the NPCSC's interpretive approach
as well? This issue remains because the NPCSC adopted the original
legislative intent approach in its interpretation, while the Hong Kong courts
have obviously taken a very different approach.
In the right of abode case, the CFA clearly stated that it adopted a
broad and purposive approach in interpreting the Basic Law, particularly the
provisions relating to fundamental human rights.' 68  Furthermore, in the
most recent case on adopted children decided by the Court of First Instance
("CFI") of the High Court, 169 the CFI held that the word "born" in Article
24(3) of the Basic Law should be interpreted broadly to include not only
those children actually born to Hong Kong residents, but also those children
163 Personal discussion with Professor Wang Guiguo, Woo Po Shing Professor Chair Professor of
Chinese and Comparative Law at the City University of Hong Kong School of Law.
'6 See supra note 36.
165 See Basic Law, supra note 3, art. 158(1). Moreover, it has also been admitted by the CFA itself in
its statement of clarification issued on February 26, 1999. See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, No.
2, 1 HKC 425 (Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases.
'66 See Ng Ka Ling, I HKC 425.167 This is because the Basic Law is the constitutional document of the HKSAR. It follows that any
interpretation of the constitutional document will have the same effect as the constitutional document itself,
provided that the interpretation is made by an organ with appropriate authority and according to appropriate
procedure. See Regina Ip, Secretary for Security, Speech to the Legislative Council On Moving Motion for
the Resolution for Amending Schedule I to the Immigration Ordinance (July 14, 1999).
1Ss See Ng Ka Ling, I HKC 425.
169 See Xie Xiao Yi v. Director of Immigration, 3 HKC 148 (Court of First Instance 1999), available
in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases; Tam Nga Yin v. Director of Immigration, 3 HKC 148 (Court of First
Instance 1999), available in LEXIS, Hong Kong Cases. The Court of First Instance delivered its judgment
on June 25, 1999. XieXiao Yi, 3 HKC 148.
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adopted by Hong Kong residents. 170 Various courts in Hong Kong at
different levels have adopted the same approach in interpreting the Basic
Law. However, those cases were decided before the NPCSC issued its
interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2) of the Basic Law.
The NPCSC's interpretation states that Article 24(3) refers to children
born to Hong Kong residents, of which at least one must have been a
permanent resident before the children were born. 17 1 As shown above, the
NPCSC's interpretation is inconsistent with the CFI's interpretation in the
adopted children case. Moreover, two drafters of the Basic Law have
commented that when Article 24 of the Basic Law was drafted, no
consideration was given to adopted children.172 Thus, the original legislative
intent of Article 24(3) is restricted to children born to Hong Kong
residents. 173 Currently, there are two approaches to the interpretation of the
Basic Law: one is broad and purposive and the other is based on original
legislative intent. Which one should the courts in Hong Kong follow?
The original legislative intent approach may not be feasible for Hong
Kong courts because all judges in Hong Kong are trained in common law.
They are not experts on the Chinese legal system. The traditional rules of
interpretation widely used in all common law jurisdictions are familiar to
Hong Kong judges, and they are well trained in the application of those
rules. 174 In the common law system, courts seek out and give effect to the
true intent of the legislature. However, legislative intent is expected to be
reflected in the legislative record, and court findings are based on written
legislation, objective standards, and actual materials rather than the
memories or opinions of certain legislators or draftsmen. 175 It is at least very
difficult and unrealistic, if not impossible, for judges in Hong Kong to
ascertain the original legislative intent of a provision of the Basic Law as
understood by the NPCSC. 176 One reason for this is the fact that the NPCSC
'70 This case is solely concerned with the interpretation of Article 24 of the Basic Law, which is
within the autonomy of the HKSAR. No referral should be made to the NPCSC for interpretation.
:71 See supra note 36.
172 See Xiao Weiyun & Wu Jianfan, Gaoyuan Jieshi Jibenfa "Suoshen" Bu Juxian Qingshen Neidi
Linyang Zilu Huopan Jugangquan [The High Court Interprets That "Born of' Is Not Limited to "Born of'
Directly and Adopted Children from Mainland China Are Granted Right ofAbode], APPLE DAILY, June 26,
1999, at A2.
173 See id.
174 For a discussion of the rules of statutory interpretation in the HKSAR, see PETER WESLEY-SMITH,
THE SOURCES OF HONG KONG LAW 225-302 (1994).175 The courts can refer to legislative background, the debates of legislators on the draft law, and
various other external sources to find out the true intent of the legislature. See BENION, supra note 116, at
458-546; BELL & ENGLE, supra note 116, at 142-64; see also Chang, supra note 137.176 In practice, the opinions of the Basic Law drafters about the original legislative meaning of a
provision may differ from each other. See Johannes M. M. Chan, Renda Shifa Chongii Fazhi [The
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may add new meanings to a law in its interpretation, and objective
documentation reflecting the changes prior to the interpretation do not exist.
The only way Hong Kong courts may ensure that their interpretations of the
Basic Law are consistent with those of the NPCSC is through interpretation
from the NPCSC. However, requiring a request for interpretation in every
case relating to the interpretation of the Basic Law violates Article 158 of
the Basic Law and completely ruins the Hong Kong courts' authority of final
adjudication of those cases within Hong Kong's autonomy. As a result,
judicial independence and the rule of law in Hong Kong would be
compromised under such an approach.
If the courts in Hong Kong are not required to follow the original
legislative intent approach in interpreting the Basic Law, then the only
viable and feasible alternative is to allow them to continue using a broad and
purposive approach as they did before Hong Kong's handover to China.
This would give full effect to the concept of "two systems" in Hong Kong
without rejecting the concept of "one country" or denying the NPCSC's
interpretive authority. While emphasizing the importance of maintaining the
distinctiveness of the two systems, it should also be noted that the Basic Law
brings the two legal systems together to interact with each other and
implement the concept of "one country." As far as interpretive authority is
concerned, the NPCSC's authority to interpret the relevant provisions of the
Basic Law should be fully acknowledged. Whenever the need for
interpretation arises, a referral should be made and the NPCSC should abide
by its own rules of interpretation. This is because the Basic Law is national
legislation, and the NPCSC has the authority to interpret it in accordance
with both Article 158(1) of the Basic Law and Article 67(4) of the PRC
Constitution.177 It is impractical to ask the NPCSC to interpret the Basic
Law according to the interpretive approach followed by the courts in Hong
Kong primarily for the same reasons that Hong Kong courts should not
apply the original legislative intent approach. Instead, the NPCSC should
continue to use its own interpretive approach. 78 Therefore, two different
approaches should be adopted in the interpretation of the Basic Law by the
NPCSC and the courts in Hong Kong.
Interpretation of the NPCSC Damages the Rule of Law], reprinted in Hong Kong Bar Ass'n Homepage
(visited June 29, 1999) <http://www.hkba.org/bars.columni/home.htm>.
17 Article 67(4) provides that the NPCSC has the power to interpret statutes. See PRC Constitution,
supra note 34, art. 67(4).
178 As a matter of fact, the NPCSC does not have a well-established interpretation method. That is
why some scholars have argued that Hong Kong has an important role to play in influencing the
development of the Chinese legal system. See, e.g., Wen Hongshi, The Impact of the NPCSC
Interpretation of the Basic Law upon Chinese Legal System, XING BAO, June 28, 1999, at 6.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Theoretically, the issues in the right of abode case deal with a
fundamental issue in constitutional law-the proper allocation of statutory
interpretive authority among different governmental organs under the
constitution. The unique situation here is the allocation of authority to
interpret a regional constitution, rather than a national constitution, between
the legislature of the central government and the judiciary of the local
government. The case is further complicated by the fact that the central
government and the local government have two different legal systems
which the regional constitution brought together. The issue of the proper
statutory interpretive approach is more jurisprudential and is not a pure
constitutional law issue. It is a fundamental legal issue which impacts Hong
Kong's entire legal system. The interpretive approach adopted by Hong
Kong's judiciary will affect the interpretation of not only the Basic Law,
which is the regional constitution, but also all regional legislation made by
the regional legislature. There is little experience or theory that can be
borrowed from other countries that relates to this unique system, so a new
constitutional jurisprudence must be created.
This Article suggests that the idea of "one country, two systems" is a
completely novel concept. It must be admitted that the authority to interpret
the Basic Law is shared by the NPCSC and the courts in Hong Kong. With
regard to the interpretation of the national laws listed in Appendix III of the
Basic Law, the authority of the CFA is limited. Assuming that the inclusion
of laws in Appendix III of the Basic Law is lawful, such laws will likely
relate to either the affairs of the central government or the central-local
relationship, and a referral will thus be needed. The final interpretive
authority rests with the NPCSC. If an issue eligible for NPCSC
interpretation were actually referred, then the direct overruling of CFA
judgments, as occurred in the right of abode case, could be avoided.
However, the potential for conflict still remains. If such a conflict
were to arise again, the following constitutional interpretive approach should
be adopted. Mainland China and Hong Kong have different interpretive
approaches, an original legislative intent approach and a broad and
purposive approach, which are both involved in the interpretation of the
Basic Law. The broad and purposive approach is one of the fundamental
characteristics of the common law system in Hong Kong. If the promise
contained in the regional constitution to maintain the pre-existing legal
system in Hong Kong for at least fifty years is to be meaningful, the pre-
existing interpretive approach should not be changed. In order to ensure the
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realization of the "one country, two systems" concept, each system should
follow its own approach when interpreting the Basic Law. When an
interpretation from the CFA is overruled by an interpretation from the
NPCSC, what should be overruled is the actual decision or judgment, rather
than the interpretive approach used. This would allow one of the main
characteristics of Hong Kong's common law system to be preserved, thereby
effectuating the Basic Law's guarantee. Otherwise, only the shell, rather
than the substance, of the common law system would survive.
The arguments above are not meant to imply that the author is in favor
of Chinese constitutional jurisprudence in the area of statutory interpretation.
China's practice of granting legislative interpretation to the legislature had
its origin in the continental legal system, but this practice has proved
impractical and has been discarded by most countries within the continental
legal system. At present, it is almost routine practice for countries with
either a common law or continental law system to grant statutory interpretive
authority to their judiciaries. It is the author's hope that the current
academic debate caused by Hong Kong's constitutional crisis will cause
Mainland Chinese scholars, as well as legislators, to rethink the PRC's
constitutional structure and the amendments necessary to eventually join the
international community in this respect.
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